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1 Introduction
1.1 Ambiguity and Expectation
Keynes has presented his extensive thoughts about uncertainty and expectation for-
mation in The General Theory (Keynes (1937)). In his views, as the core of Keynes
conception of economic society, uncertainty is not objectively measurable and quan-
tiable. Facing uncertainty, people look to the current facts, the average state of
opinion and the state of condence to form their expectation. Moreover, the depen-
dence of people for each other on the formation of their expectation opens up the
possibility of sudden mass change of these expectation. These visions of Keynes un-
certainty and expectation has undermined the foundation of the rational expectations
and the policy arguments that ow from it. Keynes argued that expectations and
uncertainty are important motive forces on macroeconomic activities. In his view,
investorsexpectations play a vital role in determining the level of their investment
which can aggregately lead to an increase(decrease) in macroeconomic activities via
the multiplier process. Therefore uncertainty and the associated instability of expec-
tations can be seen as underpinning the instability of investment, which in turn is
the main key to more general macroeconomic instability. Sudden shifts in the psy-
chological forces behind uncertainty ("animal spirit" in Keyneswords) can produce
booms or slumps in the economy.
These views on uncertainty and expectation have received a substantial develop-
ment since Keynes. The study of these ideas has found wide application for asset
pricing, macroeconomic uctuations and growth theory. However, it may appear sur-
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prising that the ideas have not been modeled more rigorously. One way around the
di¢ culties is how to model uncertainty. In Keynesopinion, uncertainty is impossi-
ble to express in exact probability and seemingly incompatible with the traditional
notion of equilibrium.2 Therefore we can not just simply predict economic behavior,
particularly investment, as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benets
multiplied by quantitative probabilities (Keynes (1937)). The purpose of this paper
is to shed light on solving this issue of more rigorously formulated Keynesian models.
In doing so, we attempt to understand the importance of ambiguity and expectation
by looking at a simple stylised model of a less developed economy in which optimistic
expectation can greatly help generate a big push. The main methodology used here
is to apply Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) to model economic rms investment
decisions in economy industrialisation process.
With a strong axiomatic foundation and reasonable experimental evidence, CEU
is most commonly used one of alternative decision theories to Expected Utility. Since
the 1930s, a signicant number of studies on decision theories under uncertainty
has been inspired by experimental evidence3, which suggest that decision behaviour
does not conform to classical Expected Utility.4 In these theoretical works, uncer-
tainty follows the formal denition from Knight (1921) which is regarded as one
2The literature on Keynesian theories are gargantuan. As a pioneering post Keynesian, G.L.S.
Shackle insisted on the importance of real uncertainty and focused on moving away from probability-
based resolutions for uncertain economies. See Ford (1994)
3See Ellsberg (1961) for a representative example.
4these alternative theories include, for instance, maximin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)); incomplete preference (Bewley (1986)); generalised expected utility(Machina (1982)); regret
theory (Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986)) and anticipated utility theory (Quiggin (1982)).
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type of interpretation of Keynesian uncertainty: uncertainty is a situation where
probabilities are imperfectly known or unknown. In CEU, individuals beliefs under
uncertainty are represented as non-additive probabilities (or capacities) which are
unique and subjective, whereas they do not satisfy all the properties of mathematical
probabilities. With such beliefs, an individual makes his/her decision by maximising
the utility named as CEU while behaving as either ambiguity-aversion (pessimism)
or ambiguity-lover (optimism). The approach is superior in the sense that we in-
corporate Keynesian features of uncertainty and expectation while still maintaining
optimising behaviour.
We label our model as Keynes-type in the sense that we capture two aspects
of Keynesarguments. First the model has two crucial ingredients of Keynes-type:
specialisation and imperfect competition. Second, our results reect Keynes ideas
on the impacts of uncertainty and expectation on economic activities.
1.2 "Big Push"
Firstly introduced by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), the Big Pushcan be interpreted as
the switch of economy from one equilibrium to a better equilibrium path without any
exogenous improvement. This switch happens through simultaneous industrialisation
(coordinated investment) across a su¢ cient enough number of economic sectors. As
argued in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), there are a few important factors
in the Big Push. Firstly, it is assumed that world trade is not free and costless
therefore market size is deemed to be important for economic growth; secondly, the
precondition for "Big Push" is the coexistence of multiple, Pareto-ranked equilib-
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ria which implies that the economy is capable of sustaining two alternative levels
of industrialisation; thirdly, with xed preferences, endowments and available tech-
nologies in the economy, strategic complementarity and possible coordinated action
across economic sectors are present.
Under these common features of "Big Push" literature, the basic story is that
strategic complementarities among sectors generated through expenditure-demand
rather than prot-demand link give rise to the source of multiplicity of equilibria.
With the presence of strategic complementarity, the coordination among sectors
pushes an economy to a better equilibrium. It is noteworthy that strong positive
spillover across the sectors through prots is not necessary for the Big Push. The
previous studies show, if the positive spillover is generated through prots, then equi-
librium is unique; however if an industrialising rm raises the size of other rms
markets even when it itself loses money, multiple equilibria arise naturally. In other
words, even each industrialised rm can not break even individually with its invest-
ment, the strategic complementarity across rms imply that simultaneously coordi-
nated investment of su¢ ciently many rms will make industrialisation self-sustained.
Therefore it is easy to see that macroeconomic externality and strategic comple-
mentarity play very important roles in "Big Push", which are also focus of most
previous studies on this topic. The externalities have been modelled through dif-
ferent channels: labour movement, a rise in labour income (wage), also through
intertemporal aspect (dynamic part). For instance, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1989) modelled that a rm losing money can benet rms in other sectors because it
raises labour income and hence demand for their products. They also examined the
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intertemporal aspect of industrialisation in a dynamic framework and showed that
industrialisation today with negative net present value can generate a positive cash
ow in the future which raises the demand for the output in other sectors. This
framework of modelling externality has also been applied to analyse investment prob-
lems. (see Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Fatas and Metrick (1997)) Such literatures
reached similar results in the term of investment activities. By ignoring positive
spillover of their investments through the channels of labour productivity or market
size, rms underinvest. Pareto-e¢ cient levels of investment happen once this positive
externality is internalised.
Although literatures on this topic have been well established, the emphasis of
this paper, inspired by Keynesian ideas, is instead on the impacts of ambiguity and
condence on the Big Push. Like all other literature, we chiey associate the
"Big Push" with multiple equilibria of the economy and interpret it as a switch from
the non-industrialisation equilibrium to industrialisation equilibrium. But we are
interested in the following question: Since a model of "Big Push" is insu¢ cient to
predict an outcome, what else do we need to fundamentally complete the description
of such a strategic situation? By parallel reasoning, except technologies, preferences,
endowments as descriptive elements in an economic environment, do we need to
consider the expectation as suggested by Keynes? Can we reach some new results
by abandoning the use of probabilistic ambiguity in strategic interaction? To answer
these questions, we construct the model in line with the investment model in Fatas
and Metrick (1997), whilst acknowledging that the expectations and ambiguity play
a role in the estimates of the prot-stream of any newly-to-be-purchased plant or
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machinery. In this model, uncertainty can regard to di¤erent things: input costs,
demand, or shocks such as technological developments. In this paper we assume
that the ambiguity is about market demands. Strategic complementarity is created
through altering the composition of demand. In other words, demand externality
happens when the investment cost of an industrialised rm can add to the demand
for the products of other rms. Thus, market demand crucially depends on the
potential productivity of other rms. Facing such ambiguity, we showed that di¤erent
expectations can be strong enough to generate di¤erent economic equilibrium states.
In particularly, in an ambiguous situation, su¢ cient pessimism will result in the lowest
level of economic activities and depression, and in comparison, su¢ cient numbers of
optimistic agents will play higher strategies (industrialisation) simultaneously, thus
"big push" arises to self-fullled economics of euphoria. We suggest these results
are a good illustration of Keynesian views, that expectations under ambiguity by
themselves can cause the economys output to expand or contract.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic method to model
ambiguity and beliefs under ambiguity. Section 3 presents the set-up and shows the
presence of two levels of equilibrium in economic activities. Section 4 models the
e¤ects of ambiguity and its attitudes on rmsdecision. Section 5 concludes.
2 CEU Preference with Neo-additive Capacity
Traditionally it assumes that decision makers have an expected utility preference.
We wish to model the e¤ects of ambiguity and hence, assume instead, that the de-
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cision makers have Choquet expected utility. In this section, we present the concept
of CEU, an expected value of a function with an individuals belief represented by
neo-additive capacity when there is exogenous uncertainty. Neo-additive capacity, de-
noted by v; models both optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards ambiguity. The
representation in this paper has an axiomatic foundation and proof in Chateauneuf,
Eichberger and Grant (2007).
Considering an economic agent whose prot may depend in part on the behaviour
of others. Let S i denote the set of action proles for all agents except i. The notation
s i, indicates a subset of S i.
A neo-additive capacity is dened as below.
Denition 2.1 For a pair of real numbers such that   0;   0; +   1 and a
given probability  (A) ;a neo-additive capacity is dened as:
v (A) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 for A = S
+ (1    ) (A) for  $ A $ S
0 for A = 
It is easy to see neo-additive capacity is a convex combination of an additive
probability and probabilities on two extreme outcomes, one is complete ignorance with
objective probability of 1 and one is complete ambiguity with objective probability
of 0.
The Choquet integral with respect to neo-additive capacities forms a general pref-
erence representation where optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are
modelled as over-weighting either the worst outcome or the best outcome.
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Denition 2.2 The Choquet expected value of a utility function u : S ! R with re-
spect to a neo-additive capacity v is dened as: CEU(v) =
R
udv =   inf
s2S
(u) +
  sup
s2S
(u) + (1    )E (u) ; where inf
s2S
(u) = mins i2S i ui (si; s i) ; sup
s2S
(u) =
maxs i2S i ui (si; s i) ; and E (u) denotes the expected value of utility with respect
to the probability distribution  on S i:
It says that payo¤ of any strategy is valued by a weighted average of the expected
payo¤and the maximum and minimum payo¤s for given S i. With beliefs represented
as neo-additive capacities, a decision-maker still has probability distribution  on
the events, however, (s)he assigns the weight (1    ) to  to represent his(her)
condence on the probability judgement. Interpreting + as the degree of ambiguity,
we have a decision-makers beliefs as additive subjective probability  when there is no
ambiguity and + = 0:With + > 0; a decision-maker can react to the ambiguity
in part optimistically and in part pessimistically. In this denition, we say that the
parameters  and  respectively represent the degrees of optimism and pessimism. A
decision-maker is a pessimist if, in the presence of ambiguity, (s)he emphasises lower
payo¤s, and is an optimist if, instead, (s)he emphasizes higher payo¤s.5 The higher
the ambiguity, the higher the emphasis on the extreme values, which mean the higher
 or  is. The simple cases will be  = 0 or  = 0.
Denition 2.3 A player is a pessimist if he uses the choice criterion: CEU(v) =R
udv =  inf
s2S
(u) + (1  )E (u) and an optimist if he uses CEU(v) =
R
udv =
  sup
s2S
(u) + (1  )E (u) as the choice criterion.
5Wakker (2001) provides precise denitions of optimism and pessimism in CEU models.
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The analysis can be complicated if we consider the case in which both  and
 are positive and big number. The sum  +  is consequently big and represents
high level of ambiguity. There is a considerable amount of experimental evidence
which suggests a decision-maker either behaves pessimistically or optimistically in
such ambiguous situations ( See Camerer and Weber (1992), or Cohen, Ja¤ray, and
Said (1985)). However there is no experiment to show that an individual has both
behaviours at the same time. Therefore we argue that it is su¢ cient to analyse
optimism (pessimism) in a pure form for which CEU with respect to neo-additive
capacity is easily applied. For the case in which both  and  are moderately big, we
focus on the impacts of ambiguity represented by  +  rather than separately on 
or :
Next, we use a simple binary game to illustrate how to apply these techniques.
2.1 Example
Consider a simultaneous move game with two players (rms), A and B: Each player
is deciding to play either low strategy, labelled as "L", or high strategy, denoted as
"H". "H" gives a highest payo¤ if the other sector choose "H" too. Payo¤s are
given by the following matrix, where M > m > 0; l > 0:
H L
H M;M  l,0
L 0; l m;m
This is a simple coordination game with strategic complementarity, and we have
at least two Nash equilibria (without considering ambiguity), ( H, H ) and ( L, L). In
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the rst, both players make higher e¤orts but get higher payo¤s. While in the second,
both stay with lower technology and lower payo¤. Industrialisation is a feasible and
socially desired but not the only equilibrium choice for players. Player 1 might not
play H for the fear that player 2 stay with L, and this in turn ensures that player 2
doesnt play higher strategy. It is easy to see that standard equilibrium renements
have no power to reduce the set of equilibria.
Now we consider ambiguity in the game which concerns the possible play of others.
If we know playersambiguity attitude, we shall know which equilibrium outcome will
be played in the game.
Consider optimistic beliefs prevail in the game, naturally we shall have < H, H >
as the equilibrium. Suppose, if possible, a <L, L> equilibrium exists, the payo¤ for
player 1 is,
P1 (H; v1) =M    l  (1  ) = (M + l)    l
P1 (L; v1) = m  + (1  ) m = m:
It is easily to see when  > m+l
M+l
; L is not an optimal choice for player 1. We would
interpret  > m+l
M+l
as meaning that player 1 is optimistic about player 2 choosing
H as the equilibrium strategy. In other words, when players optimism is greater
than certain level, they will choose H as the equilibrium strategy. Conversely, when
 < m+l
M+l
; L is chosen in the equilibrium. We see that the threshold level of optimism
for equilibria to switch is m+l
M+l
. Clearly, the value of m+l
M+l
depends on the values of
M;m and l: Inequality  > m+l
M+l
also says that H is more likely to be played, the
higher is the payo¤M from playing H, or the lower is the payo¤m from playing L.
We know that these factors dont a¤ect Nash solutions. In our opinion, our results
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are more plausible.6
Conversely, suppose players are su¢ ciently pessimistic and  = 0; <L, L> is
naturally the only equilibrium. Similarly assuming that H could be played in the
equilibrium, then,
P1 (H; v1) =  l   +M  (1  ) =M   (M + l)  
P1 (L; v1) = 0:
If  > M
M+l
; <H, H> will not be the equilibrium, player 1 will choose L in the
equilibrium. Similarly, inequality  > M
M+l
says that the lower is the payo¤ from
playing H, the more likely the player will choose L as the equilibrium strategy.
Thus we conclude that, if both players are su¢ ciently optimistic (considering
 ! 0), <H, H> is the only equilibrium. Conversely, if both players are su¢ ciently
pessimistic (considering  ! 0), <L, L> is the equilibrium selected. Next we illus-
trate these ideas in a formal "Big Push" model.
3 A Benchmark "Big Push" Model
As a benchmark for the rest of the paper, this section introduces a highly stylised
model which is in line with Fatas and Metrick (1997), and comes closest in its spirit
to Shleifer and Vishny (1988)7. Later sections of the paper will put the roles of
6The result is consistent with the one from Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), where they use simple
capacity to model players beliefs.
7Although Fatas and Metrick (1997) is about irreversible investment and Shleifer and Vishny
(1988) is about economic industrialisation, they are in the same framework. Thus we think the
approach and results showed in our paper can be applied to both topics of investment and economic
growth.
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ambiguity and expectation into the model.
In the model the economy is restricted to one-period. There are multiple contin-
uum sectors in the economy which are indexed by i on the unit interval [0; 1]. There
are two types of rms in each sector, one is a competitive fringe of rms with a con-
stant returns to scale (CRS) technology which convert one unit of input into one unit
of output, i.e., qi = ni: The other is referred to as a monopolist who is able to access
to two types of technologies, low and high productivity technologies. The low tech-
nology is free CRS technology but superior to the competitive fringe with marginal
cost of 1. The adoption of low technology represents the non-industrialisation state
of an economy. The high technology, representing the industrialisation, will incur a
xed cost which is the same to all industrialising sectors for the sake of simplicity.
The only cost of production is labour, denoted by N , which is inelastically supplied
by a single representative consumer. The representative consumer owns all claims to
prots in the economy, and maximizes
U = exp
Z 1
0
ln (xi) di

: (1)
This is a typical Cobb-Douglas utility function for a continuum of goods, where
each good is assumed to have the same share. This formulation implies identical
consumption shares across sectors and unit elastic demand for all goods. Dene yi as
the expenditure in each sector i, then the budget constraint is equal to
Y =
Z 1
0
pixidi =
Z 1
0
yidi = +W; (2)
where Y is aggregate income (expenditure),  represents aggregate prots by all
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rms and W represents total wages. Since consumption allocates identical share
along sectors, expenditure in each sector, yi will equal to Y by normalising on the
unit interval.
Now considering two technologies available for the monopolist in each sector, we
use superscript land hseparately represent low technology and high technology.
The production function for low technology is : qi = lni where l > 1: Because the
demand is unit-elastic and we assume Bertrand competition, the price in each sector
will be set as 1 and the monopoly rms capture all of the market. We use wage as
the numeraire, thus the prots of each (monopoly) rm using low technology are,
li = qi  
qi
L
= alqi; (3)
where al = (l   1) =l .
The production function for high technology is, qi = hni where h > l: To
adopt high technology the rm will incur xed cost I. Thus the prot of the rm
with high technology will be,
hi = qi  
qi
h
  I = ahqi   I; (4)
where ah =
h 1
h
:
Next, we consider the incurrence of cost I as the expenditure on intermediate
goods, which is very important for our analysis here. This assumption drives a
wedge between aggregate income Y and gross production Q: As noted before, ag-
gregate income Y will always be equal to total wages plus total prot. However,
gross production Q here will equal to demands from both the representative con-
sumers consumption, which is identical to aggregate income Y; and industrialised
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rmsconsumption on intermediate goods. Formally, we now have,
Q = Y + I = +N + I; (5)
where  represents the fraction of monopoly rms using the high technology.
Again, by normalising we have gross production, Q equal to production in each
sector, qi: Substituting equations (3) and (4) into (5), we have
Q =  (ahQ  I) + (1  ) alQ+N + I ) Q = N1 ah (1 )al :
Now we can solve the prot for rm i in the case of industrialisation as,
hi = ah 
N
1  ah   (1  ) al   I: (6)
The prot of non-industrialisation for rm i is,
li = al 
N
1  ah   (1  ) al : (7)
Examining equations (6) and (7), we can see that strategic complementarity are
present across rms. Demand here is determined endogenously by Q which is an in-
creasing function of : Intuitively, demand increases when more sectors improve their
production and  works as a multiplier. This positive externality is the focus of all
previous literatures and modeled through di¤erent channels, such as prot spillover ef-
fects, labour-wage e¤ects, or intertemporal aspects of investments in dynamic models.
As noted in previous studies, through the channel of prot spillover, one industrialised
rm contributes to the demand for other rmsgoods if and only if they make positive
prot themselves. These spillovers are not su¢ cient to generate the conditions for
14
the "Big Push", and equilibrium is unique. In this paper, we focus on the channels of
spillover other than prots. To do so we assume the incurred cost of industrialisation
I as expenditure on intermediate products produced in other rms. Thus strategic
complementarity arises in the economy through the expenditure-demand relationship
across rms. With this assumption, we actually address the fact that the rm can
ignore the positive externality from its investment then get away from the uniqueness
result of the basic model and focus on multiple-equilibria economy.
The wedge between Q and Y results in multiple equilibria. In the model, the
industrialised rm contributes to the demand for other rmsgoods by raising gross
production not aggregate income. That means, if some sectors in the economy in-
dustrialise, then they will be spending more on the products in the remaining sectors
by at least incurring industrialisation cost, no matter whether this industrialisation
increases aggregate income. These changes in composition of demand will induce the
output expansion and protable industrialisation in other sectors.
In particular, this expenditure-demand linkage can create multipliers and, when
combined with nonconvexities in technology, can lead to multiple, Pareto-ranked
equilibria. Suppose a single rm can not break even from investing, although it loses
money, it will increase the aggregate income through its expenditure which makes
the industrialisation in any other sectors become possibly protable. Hence, even it
is unprotable for a single rm to invest, investment will be protable if su¢ ciently
many rms invest. Therefore rms are interested in the productive potentials of other
sectors of the economy. This makes the existence of multiple equilibria possible. In
the case of "Big Push", this means, at a low aggregate level of industrialisation, the
15
equilibrium strategy played by rms will be non-industrialisation because it is individ-
ually unprotable to industrialise. Conversely, as long as a su¢ cient number of other
sectors industrialise, the increased demand will make industrialisation individually
protable. We illustrate this formally as below.
Assumption 3.1 The xed cost of industrialization I satises the condition (ah   al)
N
1 al < I < (ah   al)  N1 ah :
The assumption implies that no individual rm can break even by industrialising
alone, but it is denitely protable if all rms in the economy industrialise: Put an-
other way, even individually unprotable industrialisation must have spillover e¤ects
on other sectors that make industrialisation in other sectors become possibly prof-
itable. With this assumption, it is easy to see that we have a coordination problem
and there are multiple equilibria, one with and one without industrialisation, thus
there is a possibility to have "Big Push".
Proposition 3.1 Under assumption 3.1, there exist at least two equilibria which are
Pareto-ranked.
Proof. See appendix.
This multiplicity of equilibria can be characterised by a marginal rate of : Let
us look at the decision-rule for rm i to industrialise,
hi   li = (ah   al) 
N
1  ah   (1  ) al   I > 0: (8)
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In this inequality, the entire rst term is a strictly increasing function of ; the
second term is xed and constant. It is clear that there is a marginal rate of ^ which
makes,
hi   li = (ah   al)  N1 ^ah (1 ^)al   I = 0:
The intuition here is the increased prot from increased demand which is created
by ^ industrialised rms will exactly compensate the cost of industrialisation I: Thus
there is a possibility of multiple equilibria. One equilibrium happens when  < ^:
In this equilibrium, no rm incurs the cost for fear of not being able to break even
and economy will become stuck in the ine¢ cient equilibrium, no rm industrialises.
Aggregate production Q is low and equal to  + N , since no extra demand is
generated. The other equilibrium happens when  > ^. In this equilibrium all rms
expect a high level of sales resulting from simultaneous industrialisation of many
sectors and are consequently happy to incur the xed cost I to industrialise. This
of course makes the expectation of industrialisation self-fullling. Aggregation Q is
now high and equal to  + N + I. The reason for the multiplicity of equilibria is
that there is a link between a rms investment cost and its contribution to demand
for products of other sectors. Here, the rms prot in the model is not an adequate
measure of its contribution to the aggregate demand for manufactures since a second
component of this contribution, the cost it incurs, is not captured by the prots.
An examination of this proposition also suggests that the economy is capable
of a big push, whereby it moves from the non-industrialised equilibrium to one with
industrialisation when all its sectors coordinate investments. This multiplicity of equi-
librium is an very simple kind of coordination failure: if every rm industrialises then
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demand is high and industrialisation is optimal; if no rms accept high technology
then demand is low and non-industrialisation is optimal. The possible coordinated
industrialisation across rms can give rise to "Big Push" in the economics develop-
ment. Next, we examine how ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes a¤ect coordinations
across economic rms and further determine the uniqueness of equilibrium.
4 The Role of Ambiguity and Expectation
In this section, we will show that ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes have predictable
e¤ects on equilibrium outcomes. Ambiguity here refers to one sector concerning
industrialisation of others. The above analysis shows, with the presence of strategic
complementarity, the scale of industrialisation in the whole economy will inuence the
return of an industrialised sector. Expecting a low aggregate level of industrialisation
in which industrialisation is individually unprotable, a sector wont industrialise;
conversely, if a sector is quite optimistic in expecting a su¢ cient number of sectors
to become industrialised then it is individually protable to industrialise by itself.
By modeling excessive optimism and pessimism with the presence of ambiguity, our
results show that the anticipated scale of industrialisation could become greater
under optimism or smaller under pessimism. Therefore, su¢ cient optimism might
help create a Big Push in an economy, and pessimism might make an economy
become stuck in an ine¢ cient state. The ideas are illustrated as follows.
Unlike Fatas and Metrick (1997), where ambiguity relates to the cost I of the
higher level technology, in our model rms are uncertain about market demand
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while they know perfectly the distribution of I. Since rms expected prots de-
pend uniquely upon expected demand under our assumptions of unit prices, wages
and inelastic labour supply, we identify rmsChoquet expected value of outcomes
solely depending on Choquet expected value of demand.
In the presence of ambiguity, the Choquet expected value of demand faced by a
rm is,
CEU(Q) =   N
1  al +  
N
1  ah + (1     )
N
1  ah   (1  ) al . (9)
The highest aggregate production is Qh = N
1 ah when all rms are industrialised,
 = 1; and the lowest aggregate production is Ql = N
1 al when all rms are non-
industrialised,  = 0: The expected value of Q is N
1 ah (1 )al :
The rms prot when it industrialised is, hi = ahCEU(Q)   I, and li =
alCEU(Q) when it is non-industrialised.
The decision rule for industrialisation now is,
hi   li = (ah   al)CEU(Q)  I > 0: (10)
Substitute equation (9) into (10) and rearrange it, we have
hi li = (ah al)
N
1  al+(ah al)
N
1  ah+(ah al)
N
1  ah   (1  ) al (1    ) I:
(11)
Now we show how the unique equilibrium is determined with su¢ cient ambiguity
and prevailing ambiguity attitudes held by rms.
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Proposition 4.1 Facing su¢ cient ambiguity, if rms are su¢ ciently pessimistic,
i.e.,  ! 0;  ! 1; an economy will maintain non-industrialisation equilibrium; if
rms are extremely optimistic, i.e.,  ! 1;  ! 0; an economy will stay in industri-
alisation equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition clearly shows that the rst equilibrium could be privately optimal
for a single rm but the economy will have the lowest aggregate production. In the
second equilibrium we attain both private optimality and social optimality. The
economy has the highest aggregate production.
Next we show how su¢ cient level of optimism and pessimism will lead to the
determinacy of equilibria.
Rewriting equation (11) as below,
hi   li
= (ah   al) 
h


N
1 al   N1 ah (1 )al

+ 

N
1 ah   N1 ah (1 )al

+ N
1 ah (1 )al
i
  I:
The rst term in bracket is negative and the second one is positive. The other
variables in the equation are given as xed. Now considering  is at a marginal level
of ^; if rms are more pessimistic and  is su¢ ciently larger than , the negative term
will dominate the positive one, the increased prot from industrialisation is negative.
Thus, rm i wont industrialise. Conversely, if optimism prevails and  is su¢ ciently
large, the positive term will dominate the negative one, industrialisation will bring
higher prot than non-industrialisation after cost, therefore rm i will industrialise.
Intuitively, a rm is more likely to industrialise when it is more optimistic and less
likely to do so when it is more pessimistic. Why is this so? Since pessimism/optimism
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makes anticipated scale of industrialization smaller/larger than it actually is, which
discourage/encourage rms to industrialise. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Curve
 (where  = h   l) depict the increased prot  from industrialisation
corresponding to di¤erent value of : Optimism/pessimism changes the perceived
value of : When rms are more optimistic, the curve  shift leftward to ,
the anticipated scale of industrialisation now is ^2 instead of ^; which indicates the
positive value of ; when pessimism prevails, the curve  shifts rightward to
;the anticipated scale of industrialisation is ^1which indicates the negative value
of :
The results might help to explain some observations in real economic growth.
The catastrophic 2001 nancial crisis in Argentina is possibly a good illustration.
According to DeLong (2005), " when it (the currency board) collapsed, Argentinas
consolidated debt-to-GDP ratio was about 50%. That is not an unsustainable debt
load. And the Argentinean government was managing to run a primary surplus. If
there had been condence in Argentinas scal futurecondence that no nancial
crisis was on the horizonthen interest rates would have been much lower, and the
primary surplus would have generated only a moderate general decit. With low
interest rates, Argentinas prospects for growth would have been relatively good. With
good growth prospects and a relatively moderate overall government budget decit,
there would be no reason to fear that scal policy is unsustainable. Only the fact that a
crisis was expected pushed interest rates up to the level where investment was strangled,
growth impossible, the overall budget decit large, and a crisis inevitable". DeLong
further gave an opposite example, Brazil, a country with an equally intractable long-
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Figure 1: The curve  depicts the increased prot from industrialisation corresponding
to di¤erent values of : Optimism shifts the curve  upward to , the perceived scale
of industrialisation now is 2 instead of ; which indicates the positive value of  in
the case of industrialisation; when pessimism prevails, the curve  shifts downward to
1 ; the perceived scale of industrialisation is 1 which indicates the negative value of

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run problems of macroeconomic management and even worse problems of income
distribution and public management, which appears to have found a good equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the impact of ambiguity on a Big Pushmodel. We
obtain some strong conclusions from modeling psychological phenomena such as ex-
cessive optimism and pessimism with the presence of ambiguity. The results of our
example tell us that there exist some critical value of neo-additive capacity repre-
senting a sectors belief. For pessimism, if  is above its critical value, no sector
industrialises for lack of condence, the e¤ects of strategic complementarities failed
to internalised thus a Pareto-ine¢ cient outcome is the equilibrium in an economy.
Conversely, if ; representing the extent of optimism of players, is above its critical
value, all players will play the Pareto-optimal strategy in equilibrium. The further
analysis in a formal "Big Push" model tells us that the anticipated scale of industri-
alisation could be greater under optimism or smaller under pessimism. The excessive
optimism or pessimism is enough to induce an unique equilibrium. Pessimism will
cause a coordination failure leading to a depression, and optimism will lead to a
higher equilibrium strategy level and booming economy. As well known, the funda-
mental idea in Keynesian macroeconomics is that changes in expectations, or animal
spirits, can a¤ect equilibrium economic activities, in terms of either level of output or
employment. We believe that this paper provides a useful way to model these ideas.
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The main methodological feature is the incorporation of CEU preference in the
model of macroeconomic activities with presence of strategic complementarities. We
argued that such an approach can be desirable in terms of real applications because
many macroeconomic problems are characterised by both uncertainty and strategic
interaction between the economic agents. Besides applying such an approach to the
theory of economic growth, this line of work may be applied to irreversible invest-
ment problems. In this case it is our conjecture that optimistic expectation under
uncertainty can solve underinvestment.
Finally, considering the potential criticism about modelling " big push" as a one-
period process, it is a natural direction to extend the paper into the dynamic frame-
work. The other promising extension in our opinion is to nd empirical evidence,
such as the role of condence in the growth of Chinas economy. It is commonly
recognised that empirical work in this area is more challenging, which, on the other
hand, indicates it will be very contributive if successful.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. For given I which satises assumption 3.1, we have the following two in-
equalities hold at the same time,
hi (1)  li (1) = (ah   al)  N1 ah   I > 0
hi (0)  li (0) = (ah   al)  N1 al   I < 0:
Meanwhile,
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hi (1) hi (0) = ahN1 ah I 
alN
1 al = (ah   al) N(1 ah)(1 al) I > (ah   al) N1 ah I > 0:
Thus, for given I; we have two equilibria which are Pareto-ranked.
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
We prove separately two pure equilibria in the economy, given the corresponding
beliefs held by rms.
The decision rule is,
hi  li = (ah al)  N1 al+(ah al) N1 ah+(ah al) N1 ah (1 )al (1    ) I:
1. Suppose there is su¢ cient ambiguity and rm i is extremely pessimistic, i.e.,
! 0;  ! 1; the prot of industrialisation or non-industrialisation of a rm will be,
hi = ah  

N
1 al   N1 ah (1 )al

+ N
1 ah (1 )al   I:
Similarly, li = al  

N
1 al   N1 ah (1 )al

+ N
1 ah (1 )al :
Thus, hi  li = (ah   al)  

N
1 al   N1 ah (1 )al

+ (ah   al)  N1 ah (1 )al   I:
It is easy to see that, with  ! 1 and  ! 0; we get hi  li = (ah   al) 
N
1 al   I strictly less than 0. This implies that rm i will undoubtedly adopt non-
industrialisation. If pessimism prevails in the economy, every rm will adopt non-
industrialisation and we will have  = 0; which further conrm that we hold hi 
li = (ah   al)  N1 al   I < 0, therefore the equilibrium is no rm industrialise.
2. Suppose there are su¢ cient ambiguity and rm i is extremely optimistic, i.e.,
! 1;  ! 0; then the possible prot for rm i will be,
hi = ah  

N
1 ah   N1 ah (1 )al

+ N
1 ah (1 )al   I
li = al  

N
1 ah   N1 ah (1 )al

+ N
1 ah (1 )al
hi  li = (ah   al)  

N
1 ah   N1 ah (1 )al

+ (ah   al)  N1 ah (1 )al   I:
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The same analysis applies and we have hi  li = (ah   al)  N1 ah   I which is
strictly greater than 0. Therefore the equilibrium in this case is that all rms invest
with prevailing optimism.
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